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Abstract
This paper presents an automated peer-to-peer negotiation strategy for set-
tling energy contracts among prosumers in a Residential Energy Cooperative
considering heterogeneity prosumer preferences. The heterogeneity arises from
prosumers’ evaluation of energy contracts through multiple societal and environ-
mental criteria and the prosumers’ private preferences over those criteria. The
prosumers engage in bilateral negotiations with peers to mutually agree on pe-
riodical energy contracts/loans consisting of the energy volume to be exchanged
at that period and the return time of the exchanged energy. The negotiating
prosumers navigate through a common negotiation domain consisting of po-
tential energy contracts and evaluate those contracts from their valuations on
the entailed criteria against a utility function that is robust against generation
and demand uncertainty. From the repeated interactions, a prosumer gradually
learns about the compatibility of its peers in reaching energy contracts that
are closer to Nash solutions. Empirical evaluation on real demand, generation
and storage profiles – in multiple system scales – illustrates that the proposed
negotiation based strategy can increase the system efficiency (measured by util-
itarian social welfare) and fairness (measured by Nash social welfare) over a
baseline strategy and an individual flexibility control strategy representing the
status quo strategy. We thus elicit system benefits from peer-to-peer flexibility
exchange already without any central coordination and market operator, pro-
viding a simple yet flexible and effective paradigm that complements existing
markets.
Keywords: Automated negotiation, Energy contract, Multiagent system, P2P
energy exchange, Market design.
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1. Introduction
The deregulated electricity markets refrain small-scale (residential) prosumers
to actively participate in the wholesale market. The prosumers are instead ser-
viced in retail markets, where they are individually metered by large suppli-
ers [2], through representative residential aggregators and retailers. This sit-
uation leads to inefficiencies as the prosumers are incentivised to individually
control their local energy usage without taking the overall demand and sup-
ply status into consideration. The jointly coordinated prosumers’ (distributed)
energy resources potentially shape up the overall demand and offer significant
value to the energy system by alleviating the need for investment in additional
generation and transmission infrastructure [3] and by minimizing the fluctua-
tions due to renewable power integration [4]. However, properly incentivizing
the prosumers to coordinate their locally owned distributed resources is quite a
challenge, and justifiably a field of active research in Smart Grids. One avenue
is to apply distributed optimization techniques that facilitate the coordination
of the DERs that are owned and controlled by a single entity. However, these
techniques are not readily applicable when these resources have different owners;
at least not without considering the strategic interactions between the owners.
Local energy exchange may offer incentives to the prosumers to engage in
competition and local trading [5]. For energy communities, these mechanisms
may need to take into account and balance several objectives, including, next
to efficiency, altruism, or fairness of allocations [6]. Prosumers in an REC may
have diverse preferences over how their energy profiles are valued due to various
societal and environmental factors. For instance, the prosumers may evaluate
energy contracts based on several criteria, e.g. self-sufficiency or autarky, cost
of energy, loss in flexibility, sustainability, and so on [7], resulting in a private
valuation. Market-based mechanisms, in their current form, are not fully de-
signed to handle such heterogeneity in distributed decision making, where the
prosumer-specific individual allocations are of absolute necessity. In addition,
for energy communities they leave open the question who executes the central
market and receives central control of allocation and information. In the con-
text of a local prosumer marketplace with low-liquidity settings, the state of the
research fails to provide any concrete guidelines on how to perform distributed
energy allocations autonomously by considering prosumers’ preferences. In par-
ticular, as it will be discussed in details in Section 2, there is a clear research
gap in addressing energy contract settlement for sustainability conscious pro-
sumers who have preferences that trade-off costs with other quantifiable impacts
of energy trading (e.g. autarky, loss in flexibility, and so on).
While complete preferences would need to be computed and revealed for
market-based solutions, peer-to-peer (P2P) negotiation proceed iteratively, re-
ducing the amount of information revealed, and keeping responsibility with the
individual prosumers. Automated negotiation is an organic process of joint deci-
sion making where multiple stakeholders – typically represented by autonomous
agents – with conflicting interests engage and make a decision [8]. The partic-
ipating agents may have the desire to cooperate in an automated negotiation
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setting, but due to the conflicting interests, these agents intend to join hands
in reaching a common goal [9]. The negotiation approach contrasts market-
based approaches, and its iterative nature provides a more natural model for
low liquidity settings, in which personalized solutions need to be found in large
outcome spaces. We present an automated negotiation approach as an energy ex-
change mechanism to settle energy contract as energy loans between prosumers
in a P2P fashion. During each negotiation session, a pair of prosumers (repre-
sented by software agents) engage in a bilateral negotiation by exchanging and
eventually agreeing on energy contracts, comprised of several negotiation issues
(here energy volume and return time). At the start, an agent randomly chooses
its peer to engage in a negotiation, and gradually learns to make an informed
peer choice by applying a learning mechanism. The proxy agents evaluate offers
based on criteria that model the heterogeneous preferences of the users they rep-
resent: 1) loss in flexibility (in local storage), and 2) autarky or sustainability
of the offers. The agents can weigh these criteria differently, thereby enabling
heterogeneity and trade-offs between the agents. In addition to that, agents
take into account the uncertainty imposed by demand and renewable genera-
tion prediction while iteratively offering the energy contracts with higher utility.
While performing the repetitive interactions, the agents iteratively learn about
the compatibility of other agents and consequently make an informed decision
regarding choosing negotiating partners.
The main contributions of this paper are as follows.
• We propose a novel and intuitive negotiation based strategy that considers
heterogeneity in prosumers through a distributed and autonomous agent
model, where the model encapsulates the agent’s preferences on prede-
fined criteria and uncertainties in agent’s net demand in decision making
process.
• The strategy enables the agents to gradually learn about negotiating peers
and eventually to make informed peer selection that increases the overall
success rate in contract settlements.
• We evaluate the performance of the proposed negotiation based strategy
over real residential demand, generation, and storage data to elucidate the
efficiency of the strategy in increasing the social welfare over a baseline
strategy and an individual flexibility control strategy.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides an overview
of the related works and gauges the fit of the proposed strategy in a P2P lo-
cal marketplace setting. Section 3 describes a residential prosumer model and
defines the energy contract that is used in the negotiation process. Section 4
presents the negotiation based energy exchange strategy, defines required al-
gorithms and learning process, and several contextual notions of allocative effi-
ciency. Simulation case studies are presented and discussed in Section 5. Finally,
Section 6 concludes the paper with a glimpse of possible follow-up research.
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2. Related Works
In recent times, extensive research – either as academic practices or as com-
mercial or pilot projects – are conducted in the area of P2P energy trading
across the different value chain of the electricity grid. One stream of research
goes into the direction of centralized or distributed coordination mechanisms
of distributed energy resources (DER) to service-specific (e.g. ancillary ser-
vices; voltage and frequency regulations) support or to maximize the overall
economic benefits (e.g. [10]). The centralized coordination mechanisms are typ-
ically performed through the direct control method via the energy storage sys-
tem, electric vehicles, and thermostatically controlled loads. The coordinating
entity, however, needs to periodically gather the states of DERs (for instance,
electric vehicles [11] and energy storage [12]) to provide the optimized control
signals, which becomes increasingly intractable with the scale of the distribu-
tion system (e.g. the number of energy storages in the distribution network).
The distributed coordination mechanisms, on the other hand, iteratively seek to
converge (e.g. Nash equilibrium) for a particularly desirable outcome. Based on
the modelling paradigm of the system, several techniques, such as Lagrangian
Relaxation [13], and alternating direction method of multipliers [14] have been
deployed for the distributed coordination. Both centralized and distributed
coordination paradigms are interested in maximizing the overall system perfor-
mance, rather than focusing on the welfare of individual prosumer. Therefore,
the prosumers are often provided with additional incentive to participate in the
coordination scheme.
A more centralized approach to local energy market design is to use auction
formations. An auction requires to buy and sell orders of local energy submitted
to a public order book. The orders are then matched either continuously [15]
or at discrete closing times. P2P energy sharing could also facilitate the forma-
tion of a community energy market; possibly, through a community microgrid,
without any centralized control [16]). Most of the frameworks presented in the
existing literature for P2P energy exchange are not fully adhering the P2P sys-
tem architecture; they rather follow a peer-to-pool-to-peer paradigm (e.g. Fig.2.
in [17]) where a centralized entity – such as DSO – exists to facilitate the trading
between the parties, and thus are not completely automated.
Another line of research is focused on providing the P2P energy sharing plat-
form [18] through the local marketplace equipped with essential functionalities
where the prosumers trade or share energy with each other to achieve individual
benefits [19]. Unlike the aforementioned mechanisms, the prosumers are self-
motivated to participate and able to exercise full control over their DERs [20].
As described in [21], distributed (without an intermediary) P2P energy sharing
research activities are broad categories into three categories: auction model,
multiagent model, and analytical model. In [22], the authors develop a multia-
gent based simulation framework and a systemic index system for the simulation
and evaluation of various P2P energy sharing mechanisms. A detailed four-layer
system architecture model for P2P energy trading in grid-connected microgrids
is proposed in [17] with the associated bidding system for the trading between
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prosumers and consumers. The rise of P2P interactions paradigm among differ-
ent stakeholders gives rise to Game theory based strategies and frameworks that
lay the foundation of distributed decision making. For instance, a coalitional
game theory based approach is proposed to encourage sustainable prosumer
participation in P2P energy trading is proposed in [23]. In [24], the author
optimise the social benefit of prosumers in a Virtual microgrid setting when the
prosumers are exposed to different roles - producers and consumers, and anal-
yse the allocation through Stackleberg game. The importance of applying P2P
energy trading further highlighted by a concept of Federated (virtual) power
plant [25], where the P2P trading encourages prosumers to form the power
plant – through coalitions – and consequently realising the prosumers values to
power system value-chain.
Although the conducted research in both streams potentially provides eco-
nomical benefits to involved parties, the heterogeneity in prosumers’ prefer-
ences [7] – attributed to personalized allocation for prosumers – have not been
considered in deciding the energy allocations and flexibility coordination. Addi-
tionally, without proper coordination of DERs and flexibilities, an energy com-
munity may face technical and regulatory challenges [26]. Moreover, the curtail-
ment of feed-in due to excess supply of renewable energy (e.g. from rooftop PV)
and consequent reverse power flow arising from uncoordinated and individually
controlled DER maps to the loss of opportunity phenomena that could other-
wise be avoided by the synergetic and coordinated exchange of DER among
prosumers. Only recently, several noteworthy research considered the hetero-
geneity in prosumers’ preferences, where the heterogeneity arises from how a
prosumer perceives different societal and environmental aspects such as energy
contracts, generation technologies, locations of the network, owners’ reputation,
and so on in different parts of distribution networks [27], particularly through
P2P contract network [28] and bilateral P2P negotiation strategy [1]. For in-
stance, in [28], the author presents an innovative bilateral contract network as
a scalable market for P2P energy trading across the different value chain of
electricity networks considering different types of players and their preferences.
Automated P2P negotiation [8] contrasts with the canonical P2P trading
in that the former is an interactive decision making paradigm that provides a
win-win outcome under partial/no information sharing environment, while the
latter facilitates a more commodity-oriented trading platform - in more of an
architectural paradigm - where the decision making is not imperative. Auto-
mated negotiation based iterative decision making is increasingly considered to
be a promising facilitator of intelligent smart grid [29, 1]. For instance, [29] pro-
posed an automated negotiation protocol that has been applied to address the
energy exchange between off-grid smart homes. However, the designed protocol
imposes several key restrictions, in which only two exchange periods over a day
in which only equal amounts energy volume can be exchanged, and thereby has
limited applicability in real settings. In [1], an automated negotiation strategy
is utilised for settlement of energy contract in residential cooperatives consid-
ering the heterogeneity of prosumers’ preferences. The agents in [1] implement
a random peer selection strategy that, on several occasions (around 20% of
5
the total negotiation sessions), leads to failed negotiations as the agent may
choose an incompatible peer. This paper advances the work [1] by proposing
a learning-based intelligent peer selection strategy that increases the quality of
the reached agreements in terms of fairness, and the success rate of negotiation.
In this paper, the negotiation domain is enhanced to accommodate contracts
that potentially is an agreement that may be missing in a limited negotiation
domain explored the previous work. Additionally, this paper analyses the P2P
interactions for drawing insights regarding emerging cluster of prosumers with
compatible strategies.
Figure 1: An example of Residential Energy Cooperative (REC) with four prosumers/agents
– each comprising a PV panel and a residential battery – are shown on the left side. On the
right side, the interactions between two prosumers/agents (prosumer A and prosumer B) in
settling energy contracts through P2P negotiation are zoomed-in and illustrated. While the
detailed models are described in Section 3, the associated concepts and definitions are put
together in Section 4.
3. Modelling Prosumers and Energy Contracts
In this section, we present a prosumer by systematically modelling their
load and generation profiles integrated with batteries. Later, we define energy
contracts with associated concepts followed by uncertainty modelling in planning
that a potential energy contract brings. The energy cooperatives are generally
located at the Low Voltage (LV) distribution network where the prosumers are
physically connected to exchange energy. However, we limit our contribution
to the tertiary level of control without explicitly touching the physicality of the
underlying distribution network such as power flow analysis. An outline of an
REC with four prosumers, and the overall interactions between two agents are
illustrated in Figure 1.
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3.1. Prosumer Model
A prosumer is assumed to be equipped with a rooftop Solar Photovoltaic
(PV) and a flexibility resource (e.g. battery energy storage system). We repre-
sent a prosumer as a software agent, i ∈ N , where N is the set of agents in the
cooperative. Let the (predicted) generation profile (through PV panels) of an
agent i be represented by P˜ vi(t), ∀t ∈ T , where T is the set of time-periods.
Similarly, the predicted load profile of the agent i, at t is represented by L˜di(t).
In addition, the battery dispatch (load) profile is denoted as Pbi(t), and a choice
of agent i. The battery state of charge is modelled by the following equation
Xi(t) = Xi(t− 1) + ηb × Pbi(t)×∆t− b, (1)
where, Xi(t) is state of charge (SOC) of the battery at t and is operated within
a limit. The constant degradation of the battery is represented by b. The
dispatched battery power, Pbi(t) is constrained to operate within a limit. The
efficiency of the battery, ηb is dependent on whether the battery is being charged
(with efficiency ηcb) or discharged (with efficiency η
d
b )
ηb =
{
ηcb , if Pbi(t) ≥ 0
1
ηdb
, otherwise (2)
After self-consumption, the net demand of agent i becomes
L˜d
net
i (t) = L˜di(t)− P˜ vi(t). (3)
An agent i engages in a trade with a subset of peers j ∈ J ⊆ N at t, and the
volume of energy being traded with each other is denoted as exi,j(t). The resid-
ual of agent i – after self-consumption, followed by the (cumulative) exchange
with the peers and the local battery activation – is the energy either wasted or
to be traded on the external market, and is presented by the following energy
balancing equation.
L˜d
res
i (t) = L˜d
net
i (t) +
∑
j∈J
exi,j(t) + Pbi(t). (4)
3.2. Energy Contracts: P2P energy lending
A simple but effective contract to exchange flexibility in energy systems
is energy loan [30], which we here adapt to the P2P setting. In automated
multi-issue negotiation, agents negotiate over several issues with a target to
achieve an agreement – a value attribution to those issues – that generates a
socially optimal outcome for the participating agents. We consider energy loans
parameterized by two important issues over which the agents negotiate:
1. The volume of energy to be traded between two agents (denoted by q ∈
Q ⊆ R, where Q is a discrete set of energy volumes).
7
2. The time of receiving the energy back (denoted by τ ∈ T ⊆ Z+>0, where
T is a discrete set of positive time periods).
A negotiation domain Ω comprises all possible energy contracts, i.e. Ω = Q×T .
Every ω = (q, τ) ∈ Ω is a potential energy contract (or loan) within the multi-
issue negotiation that specifies a value for each issue.
The energy volume q and the return time t + τ influence respective energy
profiles for both negotiating agents and consequently affect their local flexibility
dispatch. For instance, executing an energy contract ω = (q, τ) between two
agents i and j is reflected on the exchange vector exi,j , as follows:
exi,j(t) = q,
exi,j(t+ τ) = −q. (5)
According to the energy balancing equation (Eq. 4), a change in exi,j changes
the battery dispatch Pbi(t) while keeping the residual demand constant. The
exchanged volume exi,j is bounded by the physical link constraint that describes
the maximum power to be exchanged between agents i and j. Therefore,
|exi,j | ≤ z × Li,j , (6)
where Li,j is the physical link limit between agents i and j, and z is the link
efficiency.
As depicted before, agents may have varied preferences over a predefined
set of criteria, i.e. the agents tend to weigh the criteria differently. Let C
represent the set of criteria upon which the agents state their preferences. In
this paper, we assume an agent evaluates an energy profile – resulting from
an energy contract – based on two criteria: loss in flexibility and autarky i.e.
C := { c1 = loss in flexibility, c2 = autarky}. The weight an agent i places on
criterion c ∈ C can be represented as a scaler λic (where λic are normalized
weights, i.e.
∑
cλ
i
c = 1) and is private to i. We assume, the weights are
known to agent. An evaluation function, eic,t(ω) is defined that denotes how
an energy contract performs, at t, from the perspective of criterion c given the
private preferences of agent i. Additionally, a planning horizon, w defines how
far ahead of an agent looks while deciding about the contracts. The planning
horizon depends on the uncertainty on the demand/generation prediction.
Criterion 1: Criterion loss in flexibility measures the emergent loss (in en-
ergy) due to the round-trip efficiency of the flexibility (e.g. battery) dispatch
resulting from implementing an energy contract. Particularly, activating (i.e
charging/discharging) a battery incurs loss as the round-trip efficiency reduces
the amount of energy. The evaluation function associated with loss in flexibility
is defined as
eic1,t(ω) =
k=t+w∑
k=t
Pbi(k) + Θ(Xi(t : t+ w)), (7)
where Xi(t : t+w) represents a vector of SOC profile of the battery from period
t to t+w and the function Θ(.) calculates the offset power requires complete a
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full cycle of the battery, i.e. to bring the final SOC (at t + w) equals to initial
SOC (at t). Therefore, ω directly influences the battery dispatch power Pbi(t)
through the energy balancing equation, i.e. Eq. 4.
Criterion 2: Autarky in an energy contract signifies the sustainability of
the contract, which actually measures the total (estimated) energy to be traded
on the external market provided that the energy contract is implemented. The
evaluation function associated autarky is formally defined as
eic2,t(ω) =
k=t+w∑
k=t
|L˜dresi (k)|. (8)
Agent aggregates the weighted evaluation function of individual criterion to
measure the quality of an energy contract. The utility function is defined as
Ui,t(ω) =
∑
c
λice
i
c,t(ω). (9)
3.3. Uncertainty Modelling in Net Demand
The load profile L˜di(t) and generation profile P˜ vi(t) of an agent i are pre-
dicted signals and are potential sources of uncertainties. The utility function
defined in Eq. 9 depends on the point prediction of the net demand and there-
fore, may potentially inadequate of providing robust planning of local flexibility
under uncertainty. To overcome this challenge, we utilise a set of stochastic sce-
narios of predicted net load profiles L˜d
net
i and calculate the expected utility of an
energy contract [31]. The scenarios of predicted net load profile are generated
by taking samples from a Gaussian Process comprising of
• a Gaussian error Probability Density Functions (PDF), for each of the
discrete lags l in planning horizon w, i.e. l = 0, · · · , w − 1, and
• a Gaussian PDF that models the interdependency between net load of
two consecutive periods.
A scenario s ∈ S of the predicted net load demand is calculated as
L˜d
net
i (t+ l|t, s) = L˜d
net
i (t+ l|t) + di(l, s), (10)
where di(l, s) is sampled from the aforementioned Gaussian Process, and L˜d
net
i (t+
l|t) is the predicted net demand for period t+ l when predicted at t. Similarly,
the residual net demand, defined in Eq. 4, for the scenario s is restructured as
L˜d
res
i (t+ l|t, s) = L˜d
net
i (t+ l|t, s) +
∑
j∈J
exi,j(t) + Pbi(t+ l|t, s). (11)
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Consequently, eic1,t(ω, s) and e
i
c2,t(ω, s) are be redefined for the scenario s - as
shown below:
eic1,t(ω, s) =
l=w−1∑
l=0
Pbi(t+ l|t, s) + Θ(Xi, s),
eic2,t(ω, s) =
l=w−1∑
l=0
|L˜dresi (t+ l|t, s)|. (12)
Therefore, the utility of an offer ω for the scenario s is modified as:
Ui,t(ω, s) =
∑
c
λice
i
c,t(ω, s). (13)
Finally, the expected utility an energy contract considering the uncertainties is
defined as
EUi,t(ω) =
∑
s∈S
Pr(s) · Ui,t(ω, s), (14)
where Pr(s) is the probability of the scenario s and Ui,t(ω, s) is the modified
utility of an offer ω considering the net predicted load scenario s. We assume
the scenarios are equiprobable, and thus making Pr(s) = 1/|S|. Hereafter, we
use the term utility to represent expected utility for the ease of description and
to avoid potential confusions. The pseudo-predictions of the net demand are
generated by adding a Gaussian noise to the real net demand signal.
4. A Negotiation based Exchange Mechanism
This section describes a negotiation based exchange mechanism with concept
definitions of different contextual aspects of automated negotiation, as referred
in Figure 1. The algorithms describing the pairwise negotiation process and
related procedures are presented as well in this section followed by a toy example
to further clarify the mechanism. Finally, the quantification of efficiency and
fairness of the proposed mechanism is detailed, which will be utilised to measure
the performance of the proposed method.
Given the residential energy cooperative settings of several connected pro-
sumers, the negotiation process may be understood as a multilateral negotiation,
emerging from multiple bilateral P2P pairwise negotiations2. As the negotiation
protocol, we implement the alternating offers protocol [8], which is commonly
used in automated multi-issue negotiation settings. At a particular time period,
the protocol assumes that each agent only engages in once for a P2P negotiation.
2An alternative approach could be multi to multi negotiation. We do not entertain that
option as multi to multi negotiation typically requires a mediator or a centralized coordination,
as per the current state of the research.
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4.1. Aspects of automated negotiation
To fully grasp the applicability of automated negotiation in an energy con-
tract settlement, several important aspects of the negotiation process are defined
in the following subsection.
Definition 1. Contract space: A negotiating agent maintains an ordered
contract space of potential offers comprising the set of the issues in the negotia-
tion domain, Ω. The space is ordered according to the utilities of the contracts-
defined in Eq. 14.
Definition 2. Aspiration region: The aspiration region defines the area in
the target utility space within which an agent aspires to strike a deal with the
peers. The region is bordered by an aspiration value – defined by the agent and
is private to that agent – that is specified by a quantile of the distribution of
EUi,t(ω), ∀ω ∈ Ω. In a sense, the aspiration value determines the degree of
cooperativeness of an agent; a higher quantile represents lower cooperation and
vice-versa.
Definition 3. Agreement: An agreement is an energy contract that is ap-
proved by both negotiating agents, and can be denoted by ω∗ = (q∗, τ∗).
Definition 4. Deadline: The maximum number of rounds of a negotiation
before which the negotiating agents should reach an agreement. If no agreement
is formed after the deadline, the negotiation fails, and the agents implement the
perspective no-exchange deal, i.e. they walk-away with the reservation value.
Definition 5. Reservation value: The private value a negotiating agent keeps
as an outside option in case of a disagreement. In this work, we define reserva-
tion value as the utility an agent perceives by contemplating no exchange with
peers, i.e. EUi,t(ω), when ω := {q = 0}.
Definition 6. No-deal solution: The no-deal solution resulting from the sit-
uation when the agents choose not to engage in negotiation and consequently do
not exchange energy, i.e. ω = {0.0, 0} with peers.
Definition 7. Fair outcome: An important measure to quantify the fairness
in an outcome that could be determined by the Nash solution. The Nash solution
is the outcome that maximizes the product of the utilities (Eq. 14) acquired from
an energy contract of negotiating agents (e.g. agent i and j).
ωNash(t) = max
ω∈Ω
EUi,t(ω) · EUi,t(ω). (15)
In a negotiation process, the agents distributively (and interactively) search
through the Ω to jointly agree on an energy contract that maximizes their per-
spective expected utilities. The problem of finding an agreement and the defi-
nitions above are illustrated in Figure 2. Agents’ aspiration regions are shaded
in the Figure, whose intersection region represents the area where the agents
prefer to strike a contract. To further elucidate the negotiation process in con-
text of the aforementioned definitions, Figure 3 is presented that highlights an
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Figure 2: Illustration of a contract space of two agents in relation to the definitions. The black
dots represent the potential contracts (or agreement (i.e. ω), while the Nash (Fair) outcome
is shown as a blue dot. The Pareto Frontier hosts the set of contracts that are Pareto
efficient[32]. The agent specific aspiration regions and reservation values are highlighted
.
exemplary negotiation domain and the associated utility of all possible energy
contracts calculated from the perspective of an agent that has an aspiration
quantile of 80% of the distribution that results in a value of -1.18, i.e. the agent
aspires to receive at least -1.18 as the utility from a contract. The demarcation
of the aspiration regions in the negotiation domain are outlined through the
contoured line. The figure illustrates that the agent prefers to provide energy to
its peers - resulting in high utility region for negative quantities without caring
so much about the return time, and it has a limited window of receiving energy
from peers. The distribution of the target utility perceived by the agent for the
same example is presented in Figure 4. The contract space is apparent from the
figure - as the negotiation commenced, the agent starts bidding potential offers
that incur the higher target utilities down to the aspiration quantile, which is
-1.18. By doing so, the agent follows a sophisticated bidding strategy that traces
the agent’s utility distribution over potential offers within the aspiration region.
4.2. Peer selection process
The peer selection process is conducted by implementing an -Greedy pol-
icy centred around the Nash (fair) solutions. An agent will be beneficial to
12
Figure 3: An exemplary issue space representing a negotiation domain with acquired utility.
The issues are presented at the axes whereas the utility of the contracts is plotted as a heat-
map. The contoured (darker) regions are the aspiration region as they contain the preferred
energy contracts with the utility higher than the reservation value.
pair-up with another agent where the mutually consented agreement is more
likely to be the Nash solution (Definition 7) for a particular negotiation ses-
sion. The iterative process implements an -Greedy policy that chooses a peer –
drawing parallels from choosing an action in a general Reinforcement Learning
framework– that historically provides the fairer solution, with a probability of
(1 − ), or a random peer with a small probability of . Due to the implicit
learning of what would the best peer for an agent, the agent gradually learns
to make an intelligent peer selection call as negotiation process iterates over
time. Implementing such a learning based peer selection process would increase
the quality of achieved agreement and reduce the likelihood of failed negotia-
tion sessions as the agents are already equipped with historical information of
pairwise outcomes with other agents.
4.3. Algorithms: Pairwise negotiation process
In this section, we outline several key algorithms that are required to carry
out a pairwise automated negotiation through alternating offer protocol. Al-
gorithm 1 describes the high-level algorithm of the negotiation process between
two agents A, and B at time t ∈ T via alternating protocol. The Algorithm 1
is presented in a centralized (i.e. non-agent) fashion for simplicity; an agent
version of the same can be easily inferred from the algorithm. The process
starts with creating a negotiation domain Ω that will be used by both agents.
Agents then generate perspective ordered contract space by evaluating all pos-
sible contracts in Ω while considering their utility over a planning horizon w.
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Figure 4: Distribution of the target utility of the agent described in Figure 3 with aspira-
tion quantile of 80%. The aspiration region is grey-ed out that results in the utility within
[-1.0, -1.18].
The detailed process of generating contract space along with the utilities of the
contracts therein is described in Algorithm 2. The calculation of utility for an
offer is outlined in Algorithm 3. Coming back to Algorithm 1, an alternating
offers protocol is implemented where, in each round, one of the agents proposes
an offer (picked from the ordered contract space) to the other agent until a
agreement is reached or the deadline is encountered. The process of making
and accepting an offer by an agent are detailed in Algorithm 4 and 5, respec-
tively. In case an agreement is reached, the agents implement the agreed energy
contract. Otherwise, the plans associated with the reservation values are imple-
mented by each agent. While implementing an energy contract, an agent (for
instance, A) amends to an existing exchange pool by stating how much energy
(q∗) to be traded with whom (for instance, B) and when (t) as well as by listing
the same volume of energy (−q∗) is committed to be traded back at (t + τ∗)
from B (equivalent to Eq. 5).
As the negotiation and exchange proceed chronologically, the algorithm in-
herently exhibits a behaviour similar to that of a Model Predictive Control
(MPC) [12] methodology that controls the flexibility resources (e.g. battery).
After a successful negotiation - shown in Algorithm 1, an agent implements
the agreement contract that effectively controls the battery with charge (or
discharge) signals (as per power balance equation at Eq. 4). As we already
know, for the agreement that incurs utility higher than the aspiration value
for perspective agents, the exchanged amount and the consequent flexibility
controlling signals are already optimized and robust – due to the inclusion of
demand/generation uncertainty in decision making; Section 3.3 – for the agents.
Similar to MPC, an agent repeats the same process at each subsequent iteration
while iteratively mitigating prediction errors for net demand. Additionally, an
agent may choose to deploy a sophisticated algorithm for controlling battery
without harming the overall framework.
14
Algorithm 1: NEGOTIATE-Contract(A, B, t, Q, T )
begin
Ω←− CREATE-Negotiation-Domain(Q, T )
A.GENERATE-Contract-Space(Ω, t)
B.GENERATE-Contract-Space(Ω, t)
r ←− 0
offerAccepted←− False
while r < deadline AND NOT offerAccepted do
if r%2 = 0 then
offer := A.MAKE-Offer(t)
if offer 6= ∅ then
offerAccepted←− B.ACCEPT-Offer(offer, t)
else
offer := B.MAKE-Offer(t)
if offer 6= ∅ then
offerAccepted←− A.ACCEPT-Offer(offer, t)
r ←− r + 1
if offerAccepted then
A.IMPLEMENT-Agreed-Contract(offer, t)
B.IMPLEMENT-Agreed-Contract(offer, t)
else
A.IMPLEMENT-Reserve-Plan(t)
B.IMPLEMENT-Reserve-Plan(t)
return offerAccepted
4.4. Toy Example: Energy Contract
Let’s consider two agents (Agent A and B) that are negotiating to settle
for an agreement with a planning horizon of 5 time-slots (e.g. t0 · · · t4). The
net demand profiles for Agent A and B are assumed as {1, 1,−2, 1,−1} and
{−2, 1,−1,−1, 2} kWh, respectively3. At t0, A requires 1 kWh while B can
provide 2 kWh of energy. The example is illustrated in Figure 5; the negotiation
flow is shown in left while the effect of negotiation on agents are shown in right.
The negotiation starts at round 1, when A offers B by asking -0.5 kWh
at t0 with a promise to give the energy back at t2 i.e. the offer constitutes
of ω := {q = −0.5, τ = 2}, according to Algorithm 4. B, after receiving the
offer, evaluates the offer against its private preferences on the predefined criteria
(Algorithm 5), and rejects the offer as the incurred utility from the offer falls
below (assumed for the sake of the example) the aspiration value of B. The
negotiation thus continues and at round 2, B states the offer – adhering to the
alternating offer protocol, Algorithm 1 – to A as ω := {q = 1, τ = 4}. Agent A
receives the offer and accepts it as the offer produces a utility that falls within
the aspiration region of A. The negotiation thus stops with an agreement. Note
that, the offering agents at both rounds (A at round 1 and B at round 2)
made offers from their higher (targeted) utility spaces. Therefore, an agreement
always stays in an intersection of aspiration regions of participating agents.
3In this example, we assume the temporal granularity to be 1 hour, so we can use kW and
kWh interchangeably.
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Algorithm 2: agent.GENERATE-Contract-Space(Ω, t)
begin
agent.Contract-Space := ∅
// set of offers; formation of the contract space
agent.Contract-Space-Hash := ∅
// hash for searching utility by offer
for < q, τ >∈ Ω do
offer :=< q, τ >
utility ←− agent.CALCULATE-Utility(offer, t)
agent.Contract-Space := agent.Contract-Space ∪ {offer, utility}
// populate the contract space
agent.Contract-Space-Hash.set(offer)←− utility
// populate the hash
agent.Contract-Space := ORDER-by-Utility(agent.Contract-Space)
// order the contract space by utility
Algorithm 3: agent.CALCULATE-Utility(offer, t)
begin
net load := agent.GET-Predicted-Net-Load(t)
scenarios := agent.GENERATE-Scenarios(net load, t)
// generate net-load scenarios according to Section 3.3
scenarios with offer := agent.AMEND-Scenarios(scenarios, offer, t)
// amend the net-load scenarios with potential affect of the offer on them; based
on Eq. 5
eval criterion 1 := agent.EVALUATE-on-C1(scenarios with offer)
// based on Eq. 12; criterion loss in flexibility
eval criterion 2 := agent.EVALUATE-on-C2(scenarios with offer)
// based on Eq. 12; criterion autarky
utilities := agent.λ1 × eval criterion 1 + agent.λ2 × eval criterion 2
// utility from each net-load scenarios; based on Eq. 9
exp utility ←− 0
for utility ∈ utilities do
exp utility ←− exp utility + (1/|scenarios|)× utility
return exp utility
4.5. Efficiency and Fairness
In addition to the proposed negotiation based strategy, we define a couple of
complementary strategies to analyse the comparative efficiencies of the resulting
allocations.
• No flexibility, s0: The prosumers do not activate their batteries and only
trade residuals with external market.
• Individual control, s1: This strategy is being currently utilised in the
real residential setting, where the prosumers activate their local batteries,
individually control the batteries and trade the residuals with external
market. However, prosumers do not engage in trading with each other.
• Negotiation and control, s2: The proposed strategy where prosumers en-
gage in bilateral negotiation over energy contracts with peers, implement
the agreement, and finally activate their batteries to control the residual
energy. The remaining energy is traded in external market.
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Algorithm 4: agent.MAKE-Offer(t, round)
begin
offer, utility := agent.Contract-Space.pop()
// retrieve the current best offer with associated utility
default utility ←− agent.ASPIRATIONAL-utility()
if utility < default utility then
offer := ∅
return offer
Algorithm 5: agent.ACCEPT-Offer(offer, t)
begin
utility ←− agent.Contract-Space-Hash.get(offer)
default utility ←− agent.ASPIRATIONAL-utility()
response←− False
if utility > default utility then
response←− True
return response
The properties of the strategies are briefed in Table 1. We define the per-
formance of an agent achieved by applying a particular strategy. The perfor-
mance of the proposed strategy s2 considers the realized energy profile, after
periodically negotiating and implementing the agreement. The performance is,
therefore, similar to Eq. 9 except it takes into account the realized energy profile
and the consequent battery dispatch.
ξi(s2) = λ1 ×
[
T∑
t
Pbi(t) + Θ(Xi)
]
+ λ2 ×
[
T∑
t
|Ldresi (t)|
]
. (16)
For strategy s0, the ξi(s0) only considers the autarky components - without the
energy exchange component, i.e.
∑
j∈J exi,j(t) in Eq. 4. And for strategy s1,
the ξi(s1) considers both criteria, but again without the flexibility component
(i.e. Pbi(t) = 0).
In order to validate the efficiency of the strategies S := {s0, s1, s2} in im-
proving the social welfare, we define the utilitarian social welfare as
sws =
N∑
i
ξi(s), (17)
for all s ∈ S. Moreover, we quantify the relative fairness of a strategy s (to
another strategy h) based on the Nash social welfare criterion, an established
concept of fairness [32], as following
nws|h =
N∏
i
(ξi(s)− ξi(h)) . (18)
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Figure 5: Contract realization between two Agents A and B.
Table 1: Properties of the strategies.
Strategy Local trading Flexibility activation
No flexibility No No
Individual control No Yes
Negotiation and control Yes Yes
5. Numerical Simulation and Discussion
In this section, we consider two cases of varied scaled cooperatives to empir-
ically evaluate different aspects of the proposed strategy.
• Case 1: Cooperative of 2 agents presents the effects of the proposed strat-
egy on the residual demand and consequent battery dispatch, and the
agents’ negotiation domain exploring phenomena.
• Case 2: Cooperative of 9 agents verifies the quality of the allocation
achieved by the proposed strategy from the perspectives of efficiency and
fairness and investigates agents’ P2P interactions.
• Case 3: Cooperative of 100 agents verifies the scalability of the proposed
strategy.
The aforementioned cases assume the local flexibility (i.e. battery) is owned
privately and controlled individually by the prosumers. The proposed algo-
rithms are implemented and the simulation is conducted using Python (version
3.7) programming language on a Windows machine (Intel Core i5 2.3 GHz with
16GB RAM). The total simulation period is taken as 7 days with 15-minute
granularity, i.e. ∆t = 15. The planning horizon w is set out to be 24-hours,
which means an agent evaluates an energy contract considering the potential
effect the contract will have on its energy profile in the next 24 hours. The
number of net-demand scenarios |S| (in Eq. 14) is set to 100. As for construct-
ing the negotiation domain Ω = Q × T , the set Q contains 15 discrete energy
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Table 2: Parameters used for simulations
Total simulation period, T 7 days
Time granularity, ∆t 15 minutes
Planning horizon, w 24 hours
Net demand profile scenarios, |S| 100
Number of discrete energy quantities, |Q| 15
Number of discrete time steps, |T | {2, 3, · · · , w ×∆t}
Maximum rounds of negotiation session before deadline 5000
Table 3: Agent Specifications: Case 1
Agent Reservation (%) λc1 λc2 Capacity[kWh] Efficiency
A 52 0.33 0.67 6.8 0.9
B 50 0.71 0.29 7.0 0.8
quantities, and the set T contains discrete time steps of {2, 3, · · · , w×∆t}. The
deadline for a negotiation session is set out to be 5000 rounds. The parameters
are summarised in Table 2. The case-specific parameter settings are listed in
Table 3 and Table 4 for Case 1 and 2, respectively.
5.1. Case 1: Cooperative of 2 Agents
Flexibility activation through battery enhances the potential benefits as two
agents could negotiate even when their net demand status are equal (i.e. both
positive or negative). The specification of the agents with associated battery
information is provided in Table 3. The charging and discharging rates of these
batteries are 1.3kW and 3.3kW, respectively. The SOC of the batteries are
operated within 20% to 90% of the respective capacities, and the degradation
rate is set as 0.04% of the same. As pointed at the Table, agent A values criterion
c2 than criterion c1; that is the agent places higher preferences on autarky, while
agent B prefers loss in flexibility more.
Figure 6 shows effects of energy exchange (through negotiation) and result-
ing battery dispatch between agent A and agent B. The residual demand profiles
resulting from negotiation clearly reflect the preferences of the agents. For in-
stance, the battery dispatch profile of agent B, who cares more about the loss in
flexibility, exhibits a relative fluctuating signal that results in an almost neutral-
ized losses. The apparent fluctuations in the battery dispatches are due to the
fact that they both agents implement a naive battery scheduling technique, as
described in Section 3.1. However, in the proposed framework, agents can eas-
ily mitigate such fluctuations by integrating an additional cost function - that
penalizes such behaviour, into their utility function and subsequently placing a
higher weight on that cost function.
Now, we analyse the exploration of negotiation domain by agents as they
reach agreements by scrutinizing the issue space and the outcome space. For
this experiment, the aspiration quantile of the agents are kept identical, 80%
each, while the weights of the criteria are varied - agent A: λ1 = 0.33, λ2 =
0.67, agent B : λ1 = 0.67, λ2 = 0.33. Additionally, the round-trip efficiencies
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Figure 6: Execution of an agreement. Effects of executing agreements – on net demand and
battery dispatch profiles – reached through negotiation between two agents.
and the degradation rate of the agents’ battery are diversified as well - round-
trip efficiencies of agent A and agent B are set as 80%, and the degradation
rates are set as 0.04% and 0.02% (of battery capacity), respectively. Figure 7
depicts a two-dimensional outcome space that emerges from the negotiation
interactions between the agents and their marginal cumulative distributions of
utility over negotiation domain. The trace of negotiation – from the perspective
of individual agents – illustrate the power of heterogeneous preferences and the
multi-issue setting, because the agents are able to exhaustively explore their
iso-utility curves and concede until an agreement is found.
Although the agreement does not exactly reach the Nash solution, it still
yields utilities that are located over 80% quantile range of the distributions. As
shown in the figure, the no-deal solution (defined in Definition 6) that attributes
the situation when the agents do not engage in negotiation and consequently do
not exchange energy, is located further down from the agreement. Therefore,
the agreement and consequent energy exchange are more attractive for engaging
agents. In addition, the agreement is almost co-located with the Nash solution
and thus implying the fact that the agents almost managed to crack the fairest
agreement, which could not happen due to agents’ individual preferences. The
issue space, represented by Return time (τ) vs. Quantity (q), under the corre-
sponding negotiation domain, is illustrated in Figure 8. The figure further points
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Figure 7: Outcome space: The Agreement is reached at the 1560-th round of negotiation
sessions between the agents. An exemplary outcome space of agent A and agent B with
marginal cumulative distributions of their utilities are shown. The Nash solution, agreement
and No-deal solution are plotted to illustrate their relative distances and agents’ capability
to find a deal very close to the Nash solution under the proposed negotiation based strategy.
out the aspiration regions of both agents and the phenomenon of how the agree-
ment is found at one of the intersections of the contoured aspiration regions.
As shown in the Figure, the individual traces – represented by colour gradients
– of the utility space exploration by each agent converge at the agreement.
5.2. Case 2: Cooperative of 9 Agents
In this case, we analyse a higher scaled cooperative with 9 agents. The
specifications of the agents are detailed in Table 4. Overall, the experiments is
run for a 7-day period (eq. 672 timestamps) with a success rate of 85%, i.e. 15%
of the time the agents failed to strike any deal, and no exchange is performed.
The success rate of the negotiation is improved by 5% due to the deployment of
an intelligent peer selection process (described in Section 4.2); the randomized
peer selection strategy yielded to a success rate of 80%.
5.2.1. Allocation efficiency and fairness
Figure 9 elucidates the quality of the outcome through the distribution of
the Euclidean distance from the agreement to the Nash solution, and how an
agreement outperforms a no-deal solution by being more likely to be the Nash
solution for a negotiation session. The histograms are fitted through Gaussian
distribution, and it is apparent from the kernel density of the distance distri-
bution of the agreements that the resulting allocations of energy derived from
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Figure 8: Issue space: The negotiation domain with the juxtaposed aspiration regions
bounded by contour lines for both agents. The negotiation traces, represented by the coloured
scatters, depict the behaviour of the agents with the opponents as both of them converge to
the agreement. The gradients in the traces represent the trace order - the darker ones are
with the higher utility, which the perspective agents follow to reach the agreement.
Table 4: Agent Specifications: Case 2
Agent Reservation (%) λc1 λc2 Efficiency (%) Degradation (%)
1 70 0.33 0.67 0.90 0.04
2 70 0.67 0.33 0.90 0.04
3 60 0.33 0.67 0.85 0.02
4 60 0.67 0.33 0.80 0.02
5 75 0.33 0.67 0.90 0.02
6 75 0.67 0.33 0.90 0.04
7 80 0.33 0.67 0.85 0.04
8 80 0.67 0.33 0.80 0.02
9 85 0.33 0.67 0.75 0.02
the negotiation based strategy are fairer than that of a non-negotiation based
strategy.
To further illustrate the performance of the proposed negotiation based strat-
egy, we turn the analysis toward the allocative efficiency of the same, and dis-
cuss how the strategy establishes itself preferable for all agents over a base-
line strategy of no flexibility and a strategy of individual control of flexibil-
ity without any P2P exchange, which were defined in Section 4.5. Figure 10
presents the relative increase in utility for each prosumer of an EC with 9
agents, comparing the improvements of individual control strategy and nego-
tiation and control strategy over no flexibility strategy. As seen in the figure,
(ξi(s2)− ξi(s0)) dominates over (ξi(s1)− ξi(s0)) by placing itself over the equal-
improvement dashed line. Therefore, it implies that the utilitarian social wel-
fare criterion is maximized by the proposed negotiation and control strategy
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Figure 9: Distributions of the Euclidean distance to the Nash solution from the agreements
and the no-deal solutions in the outcome space and estimations of corresponding Gaussian
kernel densities. The majority resulting agreements are locating themselves closer to the Nash
solutions, hence confirm the fairness of the energy allocations.
for all agents. Additionally, the relative fairness (measured by the Nash social
welfare, Eq. 18) is also improved by the proposed strategy, more specifically,
nws2|s0 ≈ 2.79 · 1019 > nws1|s0 ≈ 2.21 · 1017.
Now to analyse the traded energy through the pairwise interactions among
agents, we plot the periodical distributions of the traded energy (settled by
the contract) over the entire simulation period of 7 days projected over a day.
Figure 11 illustrates the distribution through box-whisker plots. The flexibility
of agents in exchanging energy is quite apparent during the sunny period, while
in the non-sunny periods, the agents are more interested in exchanging smaller
volume of energy with peers.
Figure 12 and 13 provide insights on the impact of the trading resulting
from the P2P negotiation strategy on the underlying physical network – within
the REC and through Point of Common Coupling (PCC), respectively. As the
negotiation process requires energy to be exchanged back and forth between two
prosumers, it is important to analyse the effect of that double exchange on the
distribution network. Evidently, the proposed negotiation based strategy does
not impose excessive strain in the network as shown in Figure 12. The figure
illustrates that the periodical distribution of the peak exchanged power is at its
peak around the range of 2.4kW during the sunny hours where relatively higher
congestions are expected. Having said that, the peak is tolerable considering
the size of the REC and under a safe limit of 5.0kW4. Figure 13 describes
the relative distributions of peak power exchanged resulting from the proposed
strategy and the Individual control strategy. The strategy encourages exchange
within REC and hence reduces the interactions with the external grid. While
the average of peak power flow through PCC using the proposed strategy is
4considering the Dutch power system of 3− phase 16Amp with 230V .
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Figure 10: Agents utility improvement of individual control strategy (horizontal) and negoti-
ation and control strategy (vertical) over no flexibility baseline. Agents are above the dashed
equal improvements line, hence our newly proposed strategy dominates individual control,
while also improving relative fairness (nws2|s0 ≈ 1.38 · 1019 > nws1|s0 ≈ 3.35 · 1017).
0.36kW, the same for the individual and control strategy is 0.39kW . The peak
power, i.e. the maximum of the periodical peak flow, however, increases from
2.40kW to 6.34kW when the proposed strategy is utilized. Nevertheless, the
power is still under the trip-limit of a PCC hosting the REC. Therefore, the
strain on the network due to energy exchange is not excessive. Note that in our
setting, the agents had no particular concern to minimize the peak; however, in
cases where peak congestion at POC is expected agents could model a shared
peak price component or the risk of peak violation in their preferences, thus
explicitly considering network constraints.
5.3. Case 3: Cooperative of 100 Agents
In this case, we investigate the scalability of the proposed negotiation based
strategy by extending Case 2’s 9 agents to 100 agents. The load and generation
profiles of the additional agents are copied with small variances. Figure 14 il-
lustrates the relative improvements in social welfare criteria using the proposed
Negotiation and control strategy (similar to Figure 10) when the size of the co-
operative is multiplied. As shown in the Figure, the proposed strategy improves
the social welfare indices from both utilitarian and fairness perspectives for all
agents in the cooperative. The small clusters of the scattered points are due to
the small variances in the extended prosumers’ profiles.
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Figure 11: Hourly distribution of the (agreed) energy volumes to be exchanged (q∗) compiled
over 7 days. Evidently, the agents are more flexible around the sunny hours and tend to
exchange a larger volume of energy during these periods.
5.3.1. P2P interaction analyses
In this section, we analyse the interactions between agents throughout the
negotiation process. Particularly, we focus on agents’ behaviours in settling
contracts with their peers. An experiment is conducted by executing negotiation
with all possible pairs throughout a particular period - e.g. 4 days. The idea is
to seek for any emerging segmentations (or, lack thereof) among agents while
identifying an appropriate set of agents who could be beneficial by pairing-
up with each other to produce a successful and efficient exchange of energy.
We utilised the matrix of fair outcome through Nash solution to identify the
strength of a pair. The fair outcome measure is also utilised to form the basis
of peer selection process (Section 4.2). As mentioned previously, the fairness of
an agreement measured by the distance between the agreement and the Nash
solution; the closer the agreement is from the Nash solution, the fairer the
contract is. Figure 15 is created considering the Euclidean distance between
the agreements and the Nash solutions averaged over a period of negotiation
session (T = 384, equivalent to 4 days). The figure highlights the quality of the
pairwise interactions in achieving a fair outcome. The graph does not represent
the physical network of the REC, rather it is a qualitative representation of the
P2P interaction analyses of the agents. Analysing the graph, we could identify
the set of prosumers that should (or not) negotiate with each other to create an
optimized cooperative. For instance, agents 6, 7, and 8 should not engage in any
negotiation as they never settle for any contract. The graph further strengthens
the importance of having an intelligent peer selection procedure as opposed to
a randomized strategy for the same.
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Figure 12: Distribution of (absolute) peak exchange – inside the REC and aggregated over all
P2P exchange in every 15 minutes – over 7 days of simulation period. The P2P negotiation
and resulting exchange does not congest the physical network excessively. Relatively higher
ramp of congestions could be noticeable during the sunny periods.
6. Conclusion
A residential cooperative potentially exhibits inefficiencies due to renewable
power integration and uncoordinated activations of locally owned distributed
energy resources of heterogeneous prosumers. Automated negotiation – a nat-
ural model of interaction – has the ability to alleviate these inefficiencies by
accommodating the heterogeneous preferences of prosumers in joint decision
making. In this paper, we present a peer-to-peer automated bilateral negotia-
tion strategy for energy contract settlement between prosumers. The prosumers
jointly seek for an agreement on energy contracts/loans – consisting of energy
volume to be exchanged and the return time of the exchanged energy – that
maximises their preferences by evaluating the realized energy profiles and the
consequent flexibility dispatch. Although we consider a predefined set of crite-
ria for the agents to have the preferences on, in reality, the agents may have
a diverse set of mutually exclusive constraints that shape up their personal
preferences. The proposed negotiation strategy allows the agents to effortlessly
stack-up those local constraints weighing by preferences while settling for the
contracts. Additionally, the strategy inherently follows a closed-loop solution
framework and thereby alleviating the uncertainties imposed by local load and
generation profiles. The prosumers utilise an intelligent peer selection strategy
that increases the quality of an agreement and the likelihood of the negotiation
being successful. The proposed negotiation based strategy has the potential to
identify the group of negotiation-compatible prosumers. The strategy is applied
to real energy profiles, and results in an improved utilitarian social welfare as
well as improved fairness w.r.t. Nash social welfare; which is remarkable consid-
ering that the allocations are achieved from single pairwise interactions amongst
prosumers.
In this paper, we assume the weights an agent places on the criteria to be pre-
defined, whereas in practice, an agent may be uncertain about the preferences
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Figure 13: Comparison of peak power distribution at PCC between the proposed Negotiation
and control strategy and Individual control strategy. The representative distribution of Ne-
gotiation and control strategy considers the return of the energy loan as well. The resulting
exchanges do not excessively congest the physical network in terms of peak power compared
to that of Individual control.
and may need to elicit them from prosumers in a cost-effective way [33, 34]. Fu-
ture work may investigate the case where the agents exhibit uncertainty over the
preferences and are required to negotiate successfully with partial preferences.
Additionally, we do not explicitly consider the physical nature of the distribution
system and hence refrain to perform a power-flow analysis on the underlying
distribution network. Such a consideration is really critical in analysing the
applicability of the proposed P2P negotiation and consequent exchange in real
microgrid setting - particularly, the real-time effect of power-flow, both active
and reactive, resulting from the exchange and return nature of the proposed
method. Moreover, the impact of such exchange on the voltage and frequency
regulation should need to be carefully analysed and calibrated. However, we sta-
tistically showed that the resulting exchange due to the allocation determined
by the proposed method do not stress out the network, and hence the proposed
method may be implemented in the real system. Having said that, in a follow-
up research, we will investigate the effect of the proposed exchange considering
the physicality of the distribution network.
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